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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Coordination of Warsaw Pact
Naval Forces in the Black Sea

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article, which was written by the Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Navy, discusses the necessity of creating a reliable system for controlling combined Warsaw Pact naval actions. Among the recommendations are: the expansion of the system of communications among the command posts of the allied navies, the adoption of more sophisticated equipment, and the establishment of communications among computer centers. Since the Black Sea is entered by ships of the US Sixth Fleet several times a year, he also considers it advisable to introduce unified planning and control measures to detect enemy groupings and maintain surveillance of them.

This journal is published by Warsaw Pact headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in issue No. 4 (1972).

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the [redacted] Codeword [redacted].

[redacted]
William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF
INFO. Late 1972

DATE 11 June 1974

SUBJECT

WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Some Problems of Improving the Control
of Naval Forces in Combined Combat Operations

SOURCE Documentary
Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article, which was written by the Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Navy, discusses the necessity of creating a reliable system for controlling combined Warsaw pact naval actions. Among the recommendations are: the expansion of the system of communications among the command posts of the allied navies, the adoption of more sophisticated equipment, and the establishment of communications among computer centers. Since the Black Sea is entered by ships of the US Sixth Fleet several times a year, he also considers it advisable to introduce unified planning and control measures to detect enemy groupings and maintain surveillance of them. This article appeared in Issue No. 4 (1972). End of Summary

Comment:

Rear Admiral V. G. Yanakiyev became Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian navy in January 1973. Formerly he was associated with the N. Vaptsarov Naval School in Bulgaria. The names of authors are given in Russian transliteration. Ranks of one-star (general-mayor) and two-star (general-leytenant) general officers are given in Russian for nationals of countries following the Soviet system.

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Some Problems of Improving the Control of Naval Forces
in Combined Combat Operations

by

Rear Admiral V. G. Yanakiyev, Chief of Staff
of the Navy of the Bulgarian People's Republic

The staffs of allied navies devote continuous attention to problems of control. There are numerous reasons for this, first of all the fact that modern types of armament and the nature of nuclear war have substantially increased demands on the organization of control of naval forces and means. In order to raise the control of naval forces to a level responsive to modern requirements, we must conduct a series of essential measures to improve the technical equipping and work methods of control organs.

Effective control of naval forces requires extensive adoption and utilization of computer equipment and other means of mechanization and automation, which leads to a series of additional problems requiring rapid resolution.

It is also necessary to take into account the growing mutual economic relations among the Black Sea socialist countries, which are making the Black Sea into one of their primary mutual communications channels.

Naturally, this also determines to a considerable degree the role of the allied navies in this theater. Destroying enemy naval forces in the Black Sea, and barring the entry of NATO forces into it, will obviously be a mission on whose fulfilment our navies must concentrate definite efforts.

The comprehensive development of combat equipment and the relatively small size of the Black Sea have led to a situation in which, during fulfilment of any particular combat mission under the conditions of the Black Sea theater, the operational axes and the strike objectives of the navies of the allied countries will, as a rule, coincide. In addition, there are substantial capabilities of moving the naval forces of one allied country into operating areas of the forces of another navy in order to carry out dispersal, buildup of efforts, etc. Under these conditions, combined operations of allied naval forces in the Black Sea become inevitable, which leads in turn to the necessity of creating a reliable system for controlling combined allied naval actions.

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We usually understand the term "control of forces" to mean the sum total of actions by commanders and staffs to prepare, organize, and conduct combat actions for the fulfilment of assigned tasks. It is not the object of this article to elucidate this entire procedure. We would like to limit our discussion to some of the problems of organizing the control of allied naval forces. These include problems of creating a single system for controlling allied naval forces in a theater, problems of improving the organization of coordination and control when maintaining an operating routine and when forces of one navy are being relocated into the zone of another navy, and some others.

In a separate category are the problems of forming elements to control and organize ship groupings for the fulfilment of combined missions in an operation (combat).

Of special attention to commanders and staffs of allied navies are problems of establishing the necessary operating routine in a theater and creating a synchronized system of controlling forces while the routine is being maintained. It is well known that an operating routine in peacetime represents a system of measures directed toward averting a surprise enemy attack from the sea and creating favorable conditions for the actions of friendly forces. These measures include establishing a reliable system of communications, recognition, and warning among allied navies; providing for all types of defense and protection in respective operating zones; maintaining continuous combat readiness of large units and units and the continuous duty status of forces and means; organizing uninterrupted observation and reconnaissance; and establishing the sailing schedule for combat ships and transports. Obviously the measures for controlling allied naval forces while they are maintaining the necessary operating routine in peacetime must correlate directly with the measures for implementing control of forces during military actions.

Within the allied navies the necessary conditions have been established for implementing control of forces both in resolving matters regarding the maintenance of an operating routine in a theater and when conducting combined combat actions.

However, in our opinion the system for controlling allied naval forces can be improved still more.

The main role here must be played by organizational and technical measures to establish a single system for controlling allied naval forces in a theater. It is clearly more expedient to pursue the course of further standardizing the equipment of command posts, expanding the system of communications among the command posts of allied navies and simultaneously

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adopting more sophisticated equipment, establishing communications among computer centers, etc.

It would be advisable, in establishing and developing the command posts of national navies, to take into account the capability of ensuring the control of all allied naval ship groupings from them. This would significantly increase the viability of the entire control system.

The creation of a single document to regulate coordinated efforts, mutual obligations, responsibility, and action procedures when maintaining an operating routine and carrying out certain combined missions would also contribute to increased effectiveness in controlling naval forces.

It would be advisable to improve the documentation regulating the organization of the tactical coordination of forces when they are operating as part of coalition groupings. This is especially important if it is kept in mind that there is a certain language barrier for commanders of different nationalities.

As is well known, sea communications lanes are very important for maritime states, and consequently, so is the organization of a convoy service in case of need. Without any previous groundwork, it is difficult to count on being able to organize a convoy service at, or immediately before, the onset of combat operations. In all instances this will be improvisation, which cannot produce the necessary effect. In our opinion, the convoy service and the defense of sea communications lanes in a theater must be organized in advance and centrally, with a clear definition of the responsibility and obligations of each of the allied navies.

An important stage in this process is the detailed working out of all necessary documentation regulating sea communications and their control in time of war. Thanks to the active sea communications among our countries, it is already feasible to begin practical measures for working out the control of forces to ensure the defense of sea communications lanes. For this our commanders and staffs do not require any special preparatory training.

The system of channels occupies an important place in the overall organization of an operating routine. To ensure safe navigation of combat ships and transports, there must be closer agreement of the channel systems of the allied navies. This plan also includes the question of creating a single system of navigational support for ship navigation.

As is well known, the Black Sea has been an object of NATO attention for many years. Profiting by certain provisions of the convention on the

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Black Sea straits, ships of the US Sixth Fleet, including missile-carrying ships, enter the Black Sea several times a year. This cannot, of course, fail to draw the attention of our allied navies, and we strive to monitor all activities of NATO warships. Our experience in this connection suggests that it would be advisable to introduce unified planning and control measures to detect enemy groupings and track them. We should develop and put into use general instructions to regulate action procedures, the organization of coordinated efforts, communications, etc. In our opinion, this would increase effectiveness in employing allied naval forces and means.

It is well known that the military control system cannot function without a reliable and systematic flow of information on the enemy. On the whole, we have regulated the exchange of information among our staffs regarding our probable enemies, but it seems to us that many additional measures could be taken to improve the system of obtaining and analyzing information. Paramount among these, in our view, are measures for closer coordination of the measures taken by national navies to clarify the situation in a theater, and measures to insure that the forces involved receive necessary data on a direct and timely basis.

A very important question requiring the special attention of the staffs of our navies is the improvement of the organization and conduct of radio-electronic warfare. Since a great many of the radio-electronic warfare measures taken by any one of our navies affect the activities of the other navies to a greater or lesser degree, these measures must obviously be coordinated carefully and in advance. Above all, it is necessary that these measures be carried out according to a single plan and concept and that their control be centralized. Otherwise their effect may be minimal or in certain cases even unfavorable.

During the preparation and conduct of combined combat operations, extensive relocation of forces of one navy to bases and dispersed mooring areas of other navies may take place. Completely organizing the defense and cover of allied naval forces which have been rebased to the zone of another navy is possible only when there is a well thought out system of control and a clearly worked out system of coordination among the navies in general and between the rebased forces and the defense forces of the pertinent navy in particular. One of the basic conditions for this is to have direct and reliable radio communications between the rebased forces and the forces providing their defense, cover, etc. Coordination among them must be implemented by coordination radio networks which can be deployed in conformity with unified communications documents.

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Regarding questions of movement routes, anchorages, organization of defense and cover, organization of fire, etc., rebased forces of allied navies should follow the special instructions or orders of the commander of the large unit guarding the water area involved. As a rule, all of the organization for the entry of allied forces into another zone, their anchorage there, and their departure, should be worked out in advance. To accomplish this, it is advisable to work out and obtain approval of several variants providing for entry, anchorage, and departure, which will substantially simplify organizing the control of the forces.

When the relocated forces are substantial, it will obviously be more expedient to control them directly from a remote command post deployed within the zone of the navy concerned. This will significantly facilitate organizing coordination with these forces. These command posts could be deployed separately or could be collocated with the command post of the local commander.

When we examine the main tasks whose fulfilment requires the combined efforts of allied navies, we see in the forefront certain problems connected with organizing control organs, as well as questions concerning the organizational structure of allied naval forces.

In the course of the operational-tactical training of allied navies, a certain amount of experience has been accumulated in planning and organizing combat actions for the fulfilment of tasks requiring combined efforts.

This training most often consists of making one of the allied naval headquarters responsible for planning and organizing combat actions. At the same time, each of the remaining navies deploys operations groups to provide for more qualitative planning of combat actions and the organization of coordination. This headquarters thus becomes the control agency for the combined actions of the main body of the allied naval forces. In this case it becomes unnecessary to create a separate control organ with all of the control means it would need. The system under discussion here for planning and organizing combat actions also has the advantage that it is based on the work of a cohesive and adequately worked out control organ.

We consider it expedient to broaden this practice, and we suggest studying the possibility of exchanging permanent operations groups. This will enable us, when governed by an actual situation that has developed, to set up in a short time a single control organ for combined combat actions based on any one of our headquarters. In peacetime the permanent operations groups could coordinate the conduct of combined tasks involved

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in maintaining the established operating routine in the theater and could also participate in planning, carrying out, and collating the experience of all combined measures carried out by allied navies.

With such advance deployment, operations groups will have a better opportunity to develop the required work habits and to "grow" into the situation and work of the headquarters to which they are attached. Permanent operations groups will also, in our opinion, promote the exchange of operational-tactical knowledge among staffs and, through them, also among the officers of the allied navies.

The advantages of the proposed organization of a control organ may of course be realized only if the operations groups receive high-quality training and if their mutual activity is well established. It is precisely this fact that allows us to raise the question of establishing permanent operations groups which could take a continuous and active part in carrying out operational-tactical training measures and in maintaining the necessary operating routine in the theater.

The operation of the control system for combined allied naval actions will depend to a considerable extent on the organizational structure adopted for the forces participating in these actions.

In our view, the following forms of organizationally structuring the forces are worthy of analysis.

A variant is sometimes adopted in which the forces assigned to perform certain limited tasks are subordinated to their own command and act independently only in a specific area. In this case the forces are controlled by the appropriate naval headquarters. There is no provision for their direct control by a coalition planning agency. Organizing coordination in this case is simplified and reduced to distributing tasks among the navies and to indicating the time and place of actions by the forces of each navy.

This method of organizational structuring of forces can obviously be justified only in particular instances, for example, when supporting the movement of small convoys or small detachments of combat ships across the operating zone of a given navy. But even in such an instance, this pertains primarily to the forces guarding a particular water area, and they are assigned to a specific channel, a particular area of submarine search, etc. In relation to the forces providing cover to a convoy or a detachment of combat ships from the sea, however, such a form of organization is, in our view, unsuitable. The situation will very often require the creation of fairly strong cover groups, whereas this structuring of forces allows

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the creation only of separate national tactical groups, without unified control and consequently obliged to operate without coordination.

More advantageous, in our view, is an organization of forces under which they retain their subordination to their national command but are operationally subordinated to the agency that plans and organizes the combined combat actions. This makes it easier to combine forces from the same or different arms of separate navies into one powerful tactical or operational-tactical grouping capable of accomplishing tasks with great effectiveness and in great depth, since they are controlled more reliably and flexibly. As a rule, the groups which allied navies may allocate to a unified grouping include strike groups, search groups, sweeper groups, and other tactical groups which are organizationally complete and are capable of carrying out individual missions independently during combined combat actions. This method of organizing forces may be employed during the landing of an amphibious force, the destruction of enemy naval forces, etc. The control system in this case is more orderly and effective.

The questions which we have raised can by no means cover all of the problems facing allied navies in connection with the need to improve the system of implementing control during the accomplishment of our common tasks. Some of these questions have been examined and discussed at special conferences, and we consider that the required conditions exist for putting them into practice in the allied navies. The remaining items still await resolution, which can come about only through combined staff efforts.

The operating effectiveness of the control system depends to a considerable degree on its thoroughness and on complete mutual understanding among the individual commanders and staffs functioning within it. It is a function of a control organ to coordinate the actions of separate elements of cooperating forces, and this is achieved by working out appropriate orders, maps, plans, coordination tables, etc. No document, however, can replace the practical experience acquired by commanders and staffs in training forces for combined operations in exercises, war games, etc. We therefore consider that combined measures by allied naval forces must be expanded; this must lead eventually to complete development of the organization of actions of composite multinational tactical and operational-tactical groupings.

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